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SOLUTION TO THE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS OF

AMENDMENT OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES AcT?

With passage of the Federal Magistrates Act' in 1968, much controversy developed regarding the extent of the powers and jurisdiction
conferred upon federal magistrates. Loose wording 2 in this statute led to
numerous and often conflicting decisions in the area of referral jurisdiction. 3 To remedy this problem, Congress, in 1976, amended the "powers and jurisdiction" section of the statute, 4 intending to delineate clearly
the powers and functions of magistrates 5 as envisioned but not carefully
detailed by the original act. However, this recent amendment raises
important questions involving the standard of review to be used by district
courts in considering magistrates' decisions, 6 the finality of magistrates'
decisions as to the credibility of witnesses, and even whether the problems
of the original act have been remedied.
Congress passed the Federal Magistrates Act, creating a new and
hopefully more efficient initial level in the federal judicial system, to help
reduce the burden placed on the federal district courts by enormously
increased caseloads. 7 The powers and jurisdiction of the United States
magistrates include several specified duties 8 as well as such "additional
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-39 (1970). Section 636 delineates jurisdiction, power, and
temporary assignment of United States magistrates under the act.
2. See the text at note 9, infra.
3. See, e.g., Weber v. Secretary of HEW, 503 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd,
423 U.S. 261 (1976); Ingram v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 1268 (6th Cir. 1972).
4. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, § 1, 90 Stat. 2729 amending 28
U.S.C. § 636(b) (affecting jurisdiction, powers, and temporary assignment, of
federal magistrates).
5. "The purpose of the bill is to ... clarify and further define the additional
H.R. REP. No.
duties which may be assigned to a United States Magistrate.

1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976).
6. "A judge of the court may reconsider any pretrial matter under this paragraph [A] where it has been shown that the magistrate's order is clearly erroneous
or contrary to law." Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, § 1, 90 Stat. 2729.
7. H.R. REP. No. 1629,90th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprintedin U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4253, 4257; Comment, Mastersand Magistratesin the Federal Courts,
88 HARV. L. REV. 779 (1974). Congress recognized the heavy workload of the
federal district courts in their report and specifically intended to ease this situation
by the creation of magistrates. Cf. [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4257.
8. "The additional duties . .. may include, but are not restricted to--(l)
service as a special master, . . . (2) assistance of a district judge in the conduct of
pretrial or discovery proceedings . . .(3) preliminary review of applications for
post-trial relief

. .

.

and submission of a report and recommendations to

. .

.the

district judge . . .as to whether there should be a hearing." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)
(1970).
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duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws of the
United States." 9 This omnibus clause sanctions the use of magistrates in
such areas as the conducting of pretrial and discovery proceedings and
preliminary review of applications for posttrial relief. Since the examples
in the statute were apparently not exclusive,10 the extent of referral
jurisdiction was uncertain, leaving to the courts the task of attempting to
define its scope.
Prior to the 1976 amendment, perhaps the most troublesome questions concerning referral jurisdiction were the extent of magistrates' authority and the nature of their powers in petitions for posttrial relief. " The
act lists as an illustrative duty of the federal magistrates the preliminary
review of such petitions, and this duty includes the submission of recommendations to the district judge to aid him in his decision on whether to
hold a hearing on the petition. 12 The federal courts of appeals came to
different conclusions with respect to the additional duties that may be
assigned to implement the functions set forth in the statute. 13 The solutions
ordinarily followed the express wording of the statue and required that
magistrates only examine the petitioner's motion and give recommenda4
tions to the district judge on whether to hold an evidentiary hearing. 1
However, several courts went further and allowed the magistrates to
actually hold preliminary hearings. 15 In an attempt to resolve this conflict
in the circuits, the United States Supreme Court, in Wingo v. Wedding,16
held that the requirement in the Habeas Corpus Act' 7 that a judge is to
9. Id.
10. The phrase used is "the additional duties . ..may include, but are not
restricted to .... ."Id. in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4262. But see
Wedding v. Wingo, 483 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1973).

11. See Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974); Murrah v. United States, 507

F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1975); McCusker v. Cupp, 506 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1974); Kirby v.
Ciccone, 491 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1974); O'Shea v. United States, 491 F.2d 774 (1st
Cir. 1974); Ellis v. Buckhoe, 491 F.2d 716 (6th Cir. 1974); Noorlander v. Ciccone,
489 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1973); McKinney v. Parsons, 488 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1974);
Henderson v. Brierly, 468 F.2d 1193 (3d Cir. 1972). Posttrial relief is broader than
habeas corpus alone, see Kirby v. Ciccone, 491 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1974).
12. U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1970).
13. Compare Kirby v. Ciccone, 491 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1974) and Noorlander
v. Ciccone, 489 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1973) with McCusker v. Cupp, 506 F.2d 459 (9th
Cir. 1974).
14. See, e.g., Henderson v. Brierly, 468 F.2d 1193 (3d Cir. 1972).
15. See, e.g., Kirby v. Ciccone, 491 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1974); O'Shea v. United
States, 491 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1974); Noorlander v. Ciccone, 489 F.2d 642 (8th Cir.
1973).
16. 418 U.S. 461 (1974).

17. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970).
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conduct the hearing of a petitioner's motion was not changed by the
Federal Magistrates Act, and therefore that the district judge must personally hold these evidentiary hearings and could not delegate this task to a
magistrate. "

In Campbell v. 'United States District Court for the Northern District
of California,9 the Ninth Circuit allowed magistrates to hear motions to
suppress evidence, holding that the ejusdem generis2 ° doctrine used by the
Sixth Circuit in Wedding v. Wingo2' did not apply in interpreting the act
and that the term "additional duties" was not limited to those like the
three examples enumerated in the statute.22 However, in T.P.O., Inc. v.

McMillen,23 the Seventh Circuit refused to allow the district judge to refer
to a magistrate motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment,
holding that referral was precluded because such motions involved
ultimate decision making power. The referral of actions to review administrative determinations of entitlement to benefits under the Social
Security Act, 24 another area of conflict in the circuits, 25 was resolved in
Matthews v. Weber,26 where the United States Supreme Court held that
the term "additional duties" was broad enough to encompass such referral
as long as the district judge retained final authority and responsibility in
27
the decision making process.

The above problems and decisions led directly to the 1976 amendment 28 -of the "powers and jurisdiction" subsection of the act. 29 The
House report indicates that Congress intended the act to define more
18. 418 U.S. at 472 (1974). The holding thus overruled those decisions that
allowed magistrates this authority. Id. at 473 n.19.
19. 501 F.2d 196 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974).
20. The ejusdem generis doctrine refers to the rule of interpretation that when
certain examples are enumerated, nonenumerated examples are interpreted as being
included within the frame of analysis only when they fit within the general outline

of the enumerated examples.
21. 483 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1973). Ejusdem generis was not discussed by the
Supreme Court in its affirmance. Campbell v. United States Dist. Ct., 501 F.2d 196,
201 (9th Cir. 1974).
22. Campbell v. United States Dist. Ct., 501 F.2d 196, 201 (9th Cir. 1974).
23. 460 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1972).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (1970).
25. Compare Ingram v.. Richardson, 471 F.2d 1268 (6th Cir. 1972) with Weber
v. Secretary of HEW, 503 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 423 U.S. 261 (1976).
26. 423 U.S. 261 (1976).
27. Id. at 271.
28. See H.R.REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976).
29. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, §1, 90 Stat. 2729, amending 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) (1970).
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clearly the additional duties which may be assigned to a federal magistrate.3 o The amendment overrules Wingo and T.P.0., Inc. 31 and accepts
Campbell and Matthews,32 thus allowing federal magistrates to conduct
hearings, including evidentiary hearings 33 in all cases involving posttrial
relief applications by individuals convicted of criminal offenses, as well as
motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, motions to suppress
evidence in criminal cases, and reviews of administrative decisions in
34
Social Security appeals.
In attempting to clarify the extent of referral jurisdiction, Congress
may have created a series of new problems. One such problem involves
the standard of review imposed by the amendment on the district courts for
the review of magistrates' decisions. The traditional standard of review for
special masters' decisions, the "clearly erroneous" rule, 35 was extended
to cover the district judge's review of certain federal magistrates' decisions.3 6 The "clearly erroneous" rule 37 provides for full substitution of
judgment by the reviewing court, except as to the credibility of witnesses,
if the decision of the reviewed body appears on the face of the record to be
clearly erroneous. The legislative history of the amendment indicates that
Congress considered this the standard already in use 38 for review of
magistrates' decisions, and if this determination was correct, the amendment makes no real change in the law. However, the existing case law
fails to indicate that the district courts are using the "clearly erroneous"
39
rule.
Establishing the "clearly erroneous" rule as the standard of review
both for federal magistrates and for special masters fails to recognize the
fundamental difference in the activities of these officials, yet forces the
district judge to give equal weight to their decisions. Special masters and
30. H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976).
31. Id. at 6, 11. This result was anticipated by the United States Supreme Court
in Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 467 n.4 (1974).
32. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976).
33. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, § 1, 90 Stat. 2729, amending 28

U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) (1970).
34.

See H.R. REP No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976).

35. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e).
36. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, § 1, 90 Stat. 2729, amending 28
U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A) (1970).
37. See NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1951) (one
discussion of the "clearly erroneous" rule). See also Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).

38. H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976).
39. See, e.g., Matthews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976).
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magistrates are used in very different circumstances, and the Supreme
Court, in Matthews, recognized that this leads to different relationships
with the district judge.' 0 The Court pointed out that a magistrate could
properly review administrative decisions since the trial judge remained
free to give the magistrate's recommendations whatever weight he chose,
and was not bound by the more restrictive "clearly erroneous" rule
applied to the findings of a special master. 4' The Supreme Court recognized the fundamental difference between the role of a special master and
that of a magistrate, inherent in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requirement that "reference to a master shall be the exception and.not the
rule," used in non-jury cases "only upon a showing that some exceptional
condition requires it. "42 The Court acknowledged that the master is to be
used only in the very special case where the facts are so complicated that
an "independent expert" is needed to make preliminary fact-finding
decisions. On the other hand, a magistrate is delegated tasks that are
largely only time-consuming and easily disposed of, as simple as the
master's are complex, 4 3 thus freeing the trial judge for more important and
complicated decision-making. This important distinction, the rationale
upon which the Court allowed referral to a magistrate in Matthews, is
ignored by the amendment," which severely restricts the district judge's
freedom to review a magistrate's recommendations.
Integrally connected with the question of the appropriate standard of
review is the issue of credibility. This refers to the magistrate's acceptance
or rejection of a witness's testimony as the truth, and involves the district
judge's review of the magistrate's determination. The magistrate, now
with the authority to hear testimony from witnesses, draws inferences and
reaches a conclusion as to truthfulness. Ordinarily, this is the function of
the trial judge, but under the amendment he has only a written record on
which to base his decision, although it seems that Congress approved the
suggestion in Campbell that the district judge listen to a tape recording of
the magistrate's proceedings. 45 From this he will be able to draw certain
40. Id. at 273.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 272. FED. R. Civ. P. 53. Under the 1976 amendment to the Federal
Magistrates Act, special masters are limited to consent cases only under subparagraph (b)(2) of Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, § 1, 90 Stat. 2729.
43. 423 U.S. at 275.
44. The amendment would require application of the "clearly erroneous" rule
to certain decisions of the federal magistrates. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A) (1970).
45. H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976), quoting from Campbell
v. United States Dist. Ct., 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879
(1974).
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inferences of his own, though not to the same extent as if he had conducted
the proceedings himself. Therefore, by application of the "clearly erroneous" rule in matters where a decision is based on the credibility of
conflicting witnesses, a magistrate, hearing those witnesses and drawing
inferences of truthfulness, will have, in effect, final adjudicative au47
thority, 6 a result clearly not accepted by the courts under the old statute.
Courts might solve this problem and still allow the statute to function
properly by adopting a standard of review that would be less restrictive48
than the "clearly erroneous" rule. In dealing with motions to dismiss, to
suppress, to grant summary judgment, to review administrative decisions,
and any other motions that would involve a final decision of a case, the
district judge could receive proposed findings of fact and recommendations from the magistrate, but either party would be entitled to a de novo
determination by the district judge on timely and specific objection. 49 The
trial judge could then "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
findings or recommendations made by the magistrate." 50 This more extensive review would recognize the fundamental difference between masters
and magistrates, and would solve the problem of the review of witnesses'
credibility. The trial judge would be forced to be the final decision-maker,
and could, if necessary, bring witnesses before the court for a rehearing of
testimony to determine credibility. In matters where the magistrate handles issues that will be ultimately dispositive of the case, the parties would
not be denied the right to be heard by a district judge who would retain
final decision-making responsibilities. In all other matters, application of
the more restrictive "clearly erroneous" rule to the magistrate's findings
would do no real harm-for the more restrictive standard would not, in
itself, change the final decision of the case.
To accomplish this result, the district judge can define, via his
authority under subparagraph (b)(4),1 many matter that would be ultimately
. 46. This "final adjudicative authority" is only relative, being subject to review
at all stages of the appellate process.
47. See, e.g., Matthews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261,273 (1976); Campbell v. United
States Dist. Ct., 501 F.2d 1%, 205 (9th Cir. 1974); T.P.O., Inc. v. McMillen, 460
F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1972).
48. The "clearly erroneous" rule is more restrictive in that, like the standard
allowing the judge to accept, reject, or modify the magistrate's recommendation, it
allows full substitution of judgment except as to credibility of witnesses. See the
text at note 50, infra.
49. There is authority for this standard of review in subparagraphs (b)(l)(B) and
(C) of the amendment. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, § 1,90 Stat. 2729.
50. Id., amending 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (1970).
51. "Each district court will establish rules pursuant to which the magistrates will discharge their duties." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(4) (1976).
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dispositive 52 of the case as fitting within the scope of the standard of
review that allows him to accept, reject, or modify the magistrate's
findings, 53 and therefore falling outside of the scope of the "clearly
erroneous" rule. This would comport with the scheme of the court decisions, follow the intent of the statute, and reduce the number of problems
that may result from application of the "clearly erroneous" rule.
Sera H. Russell, III

INCIDENTS TO REDHIBITORY ACTIONS UNDER
CIVIL CODE ARTICLE 2531

Two controversial 1973 Louisiana decisions dealing with redhibition
significantly altered the relative positions of consumers, retail sellers and
2
manufacturers. The supreme court, in Prince v. Paretti Pontiac Co.,
held, "There is no requirement that a purchaser who seeks redhibition
must first give his vendor the opportunity to repair the thing sold," ' 3 thus
resolving any doubts which may have existed due to contrary indications
in the jurisprudence. 4 Additionally, the court detailed the prerequisites to
52. Subparagraph (b)(1)(A) lists eight pretrial motions that would be ultimately
dispositive of a case and excepts them from the "clearly erroneous" standard.
These motions are to be decided under the standard of review set out in subparagraph (b)(l)(C) where the judge can accept, reject, or modify the magistrate's
recommendations.
53. See the text at notes 49 & 50, supra. The amendment reads that a "judge of
the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations . . . and . . . may accept, reject,
or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate . . . and may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the
magistrate with instructions." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (1976).
1. Campbell, The Remedy of Redhibition: A Cause Gone Wrong, 22 LA. B.J.
Robertson, Manufacturers'Liability For Defective Products In Louisiana
Law, 50 TUL. L. REV. 50, 94-99 (1975).
2. 281 So. 2d 112 (La. 1973).
3. Id. at 116.
4. The court stated that these doubts resulted from inferences drawn from
cases in which the buyer had in fact given the seller an opportunity to repair before
filing his redhibition suit. Id. at 116. Language supporting the inference that an
opportunity to repair is a prerequisite to a redhibition suit is found in the following
cases: Kodel Radio Corp. v. Shuler, 171 La. 469, 472, 131 So. 462, 463 (1930) ("The
defendant, therefore, after making timely complaint, and giving the plaintiff ample
27 (1974);

